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A challenge lies before us. Changing markets, consolidation of operations, new 
technology, business cycles, and factory obsolescence are resulting in permanent job 
losses from plant shutdowns. Joblessness associated with plant closings now 
contributes significantly to the statistics on national unemployment. 1 
A look at the data from across the· United States shows that in the 
manufacturing sector, 20 percent of the jobs that existed in 1969 were gone by 197.5 
along with 31 percent of the manufacturing establishments that had existed in 1969. 2 
One study estimates that between 1969 and 1976, fifteen million jobs were lost. 3 
Another estimates that more than 15,000 plants were closed between I 975 and 1981 as 
a result of foreign competition alone. t,. 
Consider the following true scenario from the testimony of a leader of the 
United Auto Workers before a committee in 1980: 
"The travails that our members have been through are many. Not having 
enough money for food, loss of cars and homes and related repossessions of 
valuable equities is a common story. An example of one person affected 
may be relevant. He is Robert Fischer from Seaman Manufacturing 
[Pontiac, Michigan1. He had 23 years of seniority. He was 58 years old 
when they closed. 1iis wife testified at the Hamtramck hearing on House 
Bill 5104-, on December 1 0, 1979, that Robert Fischer died of a heart attact 
about three months after the plant closed. His wife testified that he was 
very _§fespondent. He would not talk, eat, or sleep. He just gave up on 
life." 
The literature on plant shutdowns suggests this is not an isolated event. Ahlberg 
and Schapiro state that a one percentage point increase in the annual unemployment 
rate leads to 326 additional male suicides a year.6 If the unemployment rate of 10.8 
percent in December 1982 were to persist throughout 1983, they estimated that there 
would be 1,565 more suicides than with an annual unemployment rate of 6 percent. A 
disproportionate number of these additional suicides would occur among males aged 4-5 
to 64- (those most affected by plant shutdowns). 
Harvey Brenner, possibly the person most commonly quoted on this subject, has 
slightly different figures. 7 He states that a one percent increase in the overall 
unemployment rate sustained over a six-year period would result in approximately the 
following: 
37,000 
4-20 
650 
500 
4,000 
3,300 
total deaths 
suicides 
homicides 
deaths· from cirrhosis of the liver 
state hospital admissions 
state prison admissions 
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In a more recent article, Brenner states that medical and social consequences of 
unemployment can be felt for a period of up to fifteen years after the initia,l snack. 8 
He states further that the 1981-82 recession could eventually contribute to as many as 
75,000 deaths. 
During the past recession of 1981-82 and through the present period, Minnesota 
has lost jobs and manufacturing firms due to plant closings. This report examines 
some of these plant closings to see what the experience has been. The report includes 
a methodology, case studies, and conclusions. The focus here is on the actual events 
that surrounded the closings rather than an in-depth study of the effects of job loss on 
indviduals and communities. The question of whether Minnesota has gained more jobs 
than it has lost in the past few years is outside the realm of this report. 
METHODOLOGY 
One of the problems in studying plant shutdowns is the lack of information about 
which firms have shut down. A phone call to the Minnesota Department of Economic 
Security will quickly verify that information of this nature is not currently available. 
Faced with this dilemma, the case studies were selected as follows. 
Munsingwear and Tonka were selected because they had been in the news and 
were know to be actual shutdowns. Beyond this, little was known about the events 
preceding or following the shutdowns. 
Farmhand and Knudsen Trucking were selected from the report "Minnesota 
Businesses and Jobs, 1967-82" from the Small Business Development Center, St. 
Thomas College, St. Paul. At the time there was some controversy over the accuracy 
of this report and the two examples were chosen at random to see if they were 
actually plant . shutdowns. This report, therefore, does not claim to present a 
representative sample of Minnesota plant shutdowns, but is simply a look at four 
individual plant closings. 
THE CASE STUDIES 
Perhaps the most common statement made in dealing with plant shutdowns is 
that each shutdown is unique and cannot be discussed in generalized terms. When one 
considers the possible host of variables that can influence a shutdown, the truth of this 
statement seems apparent. For example, variables such as the local labor market 
conditions, community size, occupations, size of wages, advance notice, social 
programs available, and worker demographics can all impact on the shutdown process. 
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The study of plant shutdowns is hampered further by the fact that case studies in 
the literature lack a control group for comparison. Given this fact, there is no way of 
being completely sure that efforts made to help the workers contribute more to the 
adjustment process than environmental variables. In addition, this makes it very 
difficult if not impossible, . to provide conclusions that are generalizable. 
Nevertheless, some common elements appeared in the case studies and these will be 
discussed in the final section. 
Knudsen Trucking, Inc. 
In December 1983, Knudsen Trucking, Inc. moved its operations from Red Wing, 
Minnesota to Hager City, Wisconsin. The family-operated business had been located in 
Red Wing for over twenty years. The company headquarters, however, had moved to 
Hager City in 1979 after a fire destroyed the company's Red Wing headquarters. The 
. 
new facility (which serves as a maintenance and repair shop, a terminal, and a storage 
area) is located on land adjacent to the corporate headquarters. 
The firm hauls a variety of cargo throughout the continental United States. - Its 
primary clients are Fisher Nut, Malt O'Meal, and Sanna Dairy. Knudsen Trucking 
employs approximately one hundred workers and operates about seventy trucks with 
thirty owner/operators. Given the fact that Hager City is less than ten miles from 
Red Wing, most of Knudsen's employees remained with the firm after the move. 
According to the company, the primary reason for the move was the difference 
in taxes between Minnesota and Wisconsin. The company expects to save over 
$100,000 per year in lower taxes. 9 The biggest savings will be in the workers'· 
compensation tax. Their Minnesota rate was $12.17 per $100 of payroll. The· 
Wisconsin rate is $5.00 per $100 of payroll. This savings of over $7 per $100 of payroll 
will result in an estimated net savings of over $60,000 per year. 10 The company also 
claimed that fuel sales and coq~orate taxes were also lower. It should be noted that 
the company maintains a tire shop and an autobody shop in Red Wing. 
In addition, it is worth noting that the trucking industry, as a whole, has been 
affected in the past few years by several external changes. For example, changes 
have been made in the requirements for workers' compensation insurance with respect 
to owner/operators. Prior to this time, owner/operators were responsible for their 
own insurance. A change in policy by the insurance companies now requires the firm 
to pay these premiums. In addition, the Highway Use Tax has increased significantly 
and costs to the industry generally have risen. Deregulation has made the demand for 
services more competitive. This slows the industry's ability to pass higher costs on to 
its customers. 
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Farmhand 
In August 1982, Farmhand announced it would be closing its plant in Green Isle, 
.. 
Minnesota. They had been an employer in the area for over twenty years. On August 
31, 1983, the plant officially closed. 
The operation at· Green Isle was primarily concerned with the manufacture of 
front-end loaders for farm equipment. At the time of the shutdown, Farmhand was in 
the process of expanding its product line to include other types of farm machinery. 
At its peak in the early 1970s the plant had employed about one hundred and 
twenty workers. At the time of the shutdowns the employment level was about sixty-
fi ve. These figures vary a little depending on the dates. In the last month there were 
actually only about twelve workers left. The workers had been represented by the 
International Association of Machinists since 1966. Their wage at the time of 
shutdown was approximately $8.15 per hour. 11 The workers, on average, were forty 
years old and with fourteen years seniority at that time. They had been employed as 
welders, machinists, painters, and draftsmen. According to· the union and manage-
ment, labor relations and productivity were good at the plant and not an issue in the 
closing. Their jobs were being eliminated in an effort by the company to reduce 
. 12 . 
capacity. 
In discussing the decision to close, the company pointed to the downward trend in 
farm machinery manufacturers over the past few decades. 13 The industry as a whole 
has been consolidating so that there are fewer manufacturers. Given this trend, the 
company felt that acquisition of other farm machinery manufacturers was the way to 
insure a position in the industry. With this philosophy they purchased two financially 
troubled companies. First in 1981, they bought Hawk Bilt in Iowa. They closed down 
one of its plants and consolidated its operations. Next, in 1982, they bought Dunham 
Lehr in Richmond, Indiana. This resulted in Farmhand having an over-capacity and 
they decided to close the Green -Isle plant. 
The Green Isle plant was built in 1960. The plant in Richmond was built in 1974. 
Both plants were unionized with Green Isle being represented by the International 
Association of Machinists and the Richmond plant being represented by the United 
·. · 14 Auto Workers. The Richmond plant had a lower wage rate. The company also states 
that energy costs and taxes were a little lower in Indiana. 
However, Farmhand states that they were not looking to "escape" Minnesota, but 
were making decisions to survive, and Green Isle came up with the lower evaluation. 
Hawk Bilt is now being marketed under the Farmhand label and this will eventually be 
the case with Dunham Lehr also. 
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The company gave workers time off to interview or search for jobs if they 
requested it. They also arranged for the state job service to come out to the plant and 
sign the workers up for unemployment insurance. The company insurance plan was 
also continued for a year after the closing. 
At present, little is known about the former Green Isle Farmhand workers. The 
company maintains an office in Hopkins, Minnesota and some of the former Green Isle 
workers are now employed there. A few others followed their former plant manager 
to another small manufacturing firm. 15 The feeling of those interviewed is that a lot 
are still unemployed with some having been unemployed for over a year and having 
exhausted their unemployment insurance. 
Tonka Corporation 
On October 10, 1982, Tonka Corporation announced it would be closing its plant 
' in Mound, Minnesota. Fourteen months later in December 1983, the plant officially 
closed. During the interim the company, county, and city made preparations for the 
shutdown. 
Company efforts. Tonka originally began operations in Minnesota and had been 
an area employer for over thirty years. Its operations consisted primarily of the 
assembly and manufacture of toy trucks and automobiles. Its labor force came from 
several of the surrounding communities. Approximately 614 workers were 
permanently laid off. 
The majority of those laid off were hourly production workers. Approximately 
thirty-five salaried office workers were also laid off. The workers were an average 
age of fifty-one with nineteen years seniority. The majority were women. The 
workers did not belong to a union, with the exception of the machinists (about thirty 
workers). The jobs held by the workers in Mound, Minnesota were not eliminated, but 
were transferred to a new plant in El Paso, Texas. An internal study suggested that 
moving the company to El Paso could reduce taxes 62 percent, labor costs 42 percent, 
and transportation expenses 5 percent.16 This would produce a combined overall 
,. 
savings of 30 percent. 
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Number of 
Employees 
Town Displaced 
Mound 150 
Watertown 54 
Delano 43 
Waconia 41 
Montrose 25 
Howard Lake 24 
Norwood 20 
Saint Bonifacius 20 
Winsted 20 
Maple Plain 19 
Silver Lake 18 
Lester Prairie 17 
Young America 16 
Glencoe 15 
All others 228 
710 
*The 710 employee total above 
includes both active and those on 
layoff status at the time of the 
announcement. 
The major tax savings was projected to come in a reduction of state unemploy-
ment taxes. 17 The company suggests that the toy industry, in some regards, is similar 
to the automobile industry. Each year they retool to make model changes. This 
retooling results in a major layoff every year from approximately December to late 
February. This placed Tonka at the highest level of state unemployment tax. Tonka 
paid the following unemployment taxes: 
1983 $ 463,044 
1982 453,935 
1981 772,779 
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According to Tonka, new employers in Texas are assigned a tax rate of 2.7 
percent on a base of $7,000; and after eighteen months, are assigned a tax rate based 
on actual experience. The minimum in Texas is • .5 percent. The maximum is 8.4 
percent applied to a wage base of $7,000. The Texas maximum of 8.4 percent is 
greater than Minnesota's maximum of 7 • .5 percent, however, the Minnesota base is 
$9,800 (as of 1984). At the maximum rate this translates to $73.5 per employee in 
Minnesota compared to $.588 per employee in Texas. Assuming the maximum rates in 
both states and applying them to a level of 700 employees, Tonka will save in excess 
of $100,000 per year ($73.5-$.588 = $147 x 700 employees= $102,900). 
Actually, the initial savings will be higher than this given the fact that the 
company will be assessed at a lower rate than the maximum during the first eighteen 
months, while it establishes an experience rating. 
The issue of labor costs is exacerbated by the fact that many of the toys sold in 
the United States are produced in foreign countries with lower labor costs. Wages for 
assembly workers average $8.4.5 at the Mound plant ($9.60 including benefits) 
compared to an average of $4.1.5 at the El Paso plant. 
Tonka hopes to lower its transportation costs as well by its move to El Paso. 
California is one of its major markets. In addition, Tonka built a plant in Juarez, 
Mexico which began operating in March of 1982. Given the closeness of the El Paso 
plant, toys from both plants can be combined and distributed together. 
One other point to consider is that the Mound building contains multiple floors 
and several piece-meal additions. The plant in Texas contains a single-floor manufac-
turing area. It is possible that this will contribute to a reduction in material handling 
costs. 
After making the decision to move, the company was faced with the decision of 
, what to do, if anything, with the employees left behind. Tonka decided to provide the 
workers with severance pay, ex~ended medical and dental benefits, and money for 
retraining, as well as alternatives for accrued pension benefits. When asked why a 
company without a contractural obligation would choose to incur these expenses, they 
simply replied "they felt a responsibility as a corporate citizen." Severance pay cost 
the company an estimated $842,360. 18 ~ 
Medical and dental benefits were extended for three months after an individual's 
layoff date. This included dependent coverage, which the employees had previously 
paid. In addition, employees had the option to extend their membership in the group 
plan up to twelve months (at their own expense). Life insurance was extended to the 
end of the month. Total costs to the company for these benefits was $144,000. 
-7-
The company set aside $30,000 to help pay tuition costs for retraining. The 
company would pay half the tuition of any employee wishing retraining. 
The company pension plan required ten years seniority above the age of twenty:-. 
five to be vested. The company waived this requirement and vested everyone with on~ 
year's seniority above the age of •twenty-five. Employees had the option to withdraw 
their money in a lump sum or to place it with the insurance company in an annuity. 
To qualify for the above benefits employees could not quit early, but had to be 
laid off. The combined costs to the company of the above benefits was slightly over a 
million dollars. 
County efforts. Upon learning of the closing, the chairman of the Hennepin 
County Private Industry Council, in coordination with the director of the Hennepin 
County Training and Employment Assistance (TEA), contacted Tonka Corporation to 
off er assistance for the laid-off workers. 
Tonka had been unaware of services available to them through the Hennepin TEA 
office. They arranged with the company to conduct a survey of their workers' needs. 
This was conducted in small groups at the plant. on company time. It basically showed 
that the majority of workers preferred to find work again rather than retrain and that 
most were willing to travel twenty to twenty-five miles to find work. It also 
identified the population demographics and desired salary ranges, and inventoried 
workers' skills and job histories. With this information, Hennepin TEA had a better 
understanding of what kind of services would be needed. 
The Governor's Job Training Office was also interested in the company. When 
they received federal Job Training Partnership Act, Title III money in February, they 
suggested to TEA that a project be initiated. They stipulated that a full-time job 
service person be included in the proposed project. 
Hennepin TEA proposed their staff be used to help monitor and evaluate the 
project; that a job ·service person be located at the plant to help with the 
unemployment insurance claims and with job development; that workshops be held to 
help the former employees· in interviewing, filling out applications, and other general 
job search strategies; and that these workshops be provided by an outside agency. 
The project was eventually funded through t!1e , Governor's Job Training Office 
with federal Job Training Partnership Act, Title III money. Originally, the project was 
awarded $50,000 and was to cover the period from June 1983 to December 1983 (phase 
I). An extension was granted from January 1984 to June 1984 (phase Il). This 
extension also included an additional $75,000. 
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After receiving the phase I funding, Hennepin TEA sent out requests for 
proposals to hire a subcontractor to do the job search workshops. Employment Action 
Center won the contract for service from August 1.5, 1983 to December 30, 1984. The 
workshops lasted three days (eighteen hours). Topics such as job goals, interviewing, 
resources, applications, and time management were covered. The emphasis was on 
preparing for a self-directed job search. 
The job service representative started working at the plant in September 1983. 
Upon beginning the project, the representative took out a map and began contacting 
all the cities within the surrounding area. This generated a list of possible businesses 
to contact. They were called one-by-one to see if they could hire any of the former 
Tonka workers. Initially over one hundred businesses were contacted and several jobs 
were developed. In addition, commitments for future consideration were made by 
several firms. This initial effort provided a foundation for the representative to build 
on as the project continued. 
At the end of phase I, Hennepin TEA again sent out requests for proposals to 
subcontract the job search workshops. However, it was stipulated at this time that 
fees paid to the· subcontractor would be on a performance-based formula. This 
resulted in a change of subcontractors. The contract went to Control Data 
Corporation's Employment Preparation Services. They began workshops at the plant 
the first week in February. The change in subcontractors produced rumblings from 
some of the others involved in helping the workers and caused a lapse in service to the 
workers. It should be noted that the rumblings were not directed at the new 
subcontractors per se, but rather at the change in the middle of the project. A 
comparison between the subcontractors' services and results is beyond the scope of 
. this report. 
The overall results of the project are as follows. A total of 424 enrolled with the 
subcontractors for help in gaining re-employment out of a possible 614. Of the 424, 
254 have been placed in a job; 1.59 are still actively looking. 19 The overall average 
wage for those placed was $5.20 per hour. The average cost per placement ($12.5,000 
divided by 2.54) was $492. The placement rate was approximately 60 percent of those 
enrolled. Of the 190 that did not sign up for help, little is known. Additionally, those 
that got jobs on their own and did not report it are not included in the above figures. 
City efforts. In between the time when the initial workers assessment was made 
by Hennepin TEA and the time when federal money was being arranged, the city 
manager of Mound became concerned that the ball had been dropped and nothing was 
going to be done. So with the support of the mayor and the city council he started 
-9-
investigating options. He flew to Wasington D.C. to learn what was being done across 
the country to help displaced workers. He returned with some ideas. 
In May 1983, before the federal money for the project had been .awarded, he 
initiated efforts to form a group for cooperative decision making. Representatives 
from the Job Service, Hennepin TEA, Tonka (both management and employees) and the 
local school districts were invited to meet with him. They formed the Tonka 
Community Coordinating Committee. The committee became a focal point in bringing 
together all those involved in the closing. It served as an information clearing-house, 
improving the communication between those involved and reducing duplication of 
effort. The individual participants were interviewed about their feelings on the 
committee. Without exception they all recommended it as a positive effort. 
Including former employees on the committee was seen as a great plus by the 
other members. The former employees were selected by the company. They had high 
seniority and were viewed by the company as somewhat informal leaders in the work 
force. Their candid comments were welcomed and appreciated. 
The committee, however, was not always smooth sailing. Personalities some-
times clashed and tempers flared. A process of adjustment was required for the 
members to get to know each other and develop the trust and confidence in the 
committee that would make it function. Having the committee at the local level 
seemed beneficial. One member commented that "by having it at the local level, it 
appeared to be better accepted by the workers, who by now were perhaps apprehensive 
of outside help disturbing their already crumbling world." 
The city manager was also concerned about what to do with a vacant 500,000 
square foot building in the middle of town. Through the efforts of many, the building 
was sold to Balboa Construction from California. They are converting it into 
industrial condominiums. 
In conclusion, it might be· noted that many were concerned about the shutdown 
and their efforts were somewhat autonomous to one another. The forming of a local 
committee did not generate the concern, but it greatly helped to coordinate the 
efforts. The advance notice given by the company allowed plans to be made and 
actions to be taken before the actual, shutdown. The company wishes to emphasize 
that giving advance notice had no adverse effects for the company, but actually turned 
out to have many positive effects. 20 
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Munsingwear 
On August 11, 1981, Munsingwear announced it was closing its Minneapolis plant. 
Musingwear had been an employer in Minneapolis for over ninety years. The plant 
officially closed in February 1982. In April 1982, Musingwear closed its Little Falls, 
Minnesota plant. The Montgomery, Minnesota plant was also shut down at this time. 
Workers were told it was just temporary, but the plant never reopened. 
Munsingwear is in the garment industry. It is involved in sewing, producing, and 
cutting fabric for garments from underwear to sports shirts. Its sports shirts can 
easily be recognized by the embroidered company logo (a penguin) on the front. 
The Minneapolis closure resulted in the loss of 425 jobs. About 350 of these were 
hourly production jobs and the remainder, salaried office jobs. Approximately 60 
percent of the production workers were men. When the Little Falls plant closed, sixty 
workers were displaced. An additional one hundred had been laid off earlier. The 
Montgomery closing eliminated one hundred jobs. Nearly 90 percent of the Little Falls 
and Montgomery workers were women. The production workers at all three plants 
were represented by the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union. Their 
wages ranged from $5.50 per hour to $10.23 per hour. A total of 685 workers lost their 
jobs with these plant closings. 
The decision to close the plants was based on the need to improve the company 
profit level. 21 The company had not shown two consecutive years of profit growth in 
twenty years. 22 The company was feeling the effects of excess capacity while at the 
same time struggling internally. A. Byran Reed resigned as the chief executive officer 
(CEO) in 1979 and Raymond Good filled the position in January 1980. He was replaced• 
by Donald Brown in October 1982. Mr. Brown was replaced by George Hansen in 1983. 
Mr. Hansen is the current CEO. 
While Mr. Good was the CEO, the focus was on reducing capacity. This resulted 
in the closing of eight plants from a total of seventeen. The three Minnesota plants 
were among the eight closed. 
At the announcement of the closing of the Minneapolis plant, the union became 
very active in trying to keep the plant open. They acted' as a catalyst in getting the 
state and city involved in trying to explore options to keep the plant open. Discussions 
were held with the company about pursuing alternatives. However, the company 
remained adamant about closing the plant. 
The union was able to negotiate some severance pay and insurance coverage at 
the Minneapolis plant. It was involved, as well, in negotiations for workers at the 
other two Minnesota plants-in Little Falls and Montgomery-but was less successful 
-11-
there. The company organized a job fair to help the workers find jobs. It was perhaps 
best described by one of the organizers "as a novel experience for those involved." 
Employers and former Munsingwear workers showed up not knowini· .exactly what to 
expect. Some got jobs, but no figures were kept. It is believed by most to have had 
. · · 23 
modest success, if any. 
The union tried to organize the workers into unemployment councils and met 
with some short-lived success. Then in 1983, it applied for and received $45,000 under 
the Job Training Partnership Act, Title Ill from the Governor's Job Training Office. 
In an effort to assess the former workers' needs and gain some information about 
their work experiences since the shutdown, the union conducted a survey of all the 
former workers. They found that current unemployment rates varied among the three 
plant sites, but that the overall average was about 30. percent. It needs to be 
remembered that the survey was completed nearly two years after the plant closings. 
After the survey, meetings were held at each of the locations to advise workers 
that some funding was available to help in retraining. Workshops on career planning 
were held at each of the locations. Retraining courses included typing, data entry, 
beautician, and nurses. aid, among others. The majority enrolled in nurses aid. 
Workers were given monetary assistance for tuition, tests for certification, child care, 
renting typewriters to practice on, and transportation (a bus card). Combining the 
workshops and retraining courses, 275 workers participated. Approximately.145 have 
. . d. b 24 receive JO s. 
In looking back on their efforts to help their former members, the union 
expressed frustration over slow paperwork; changes in the program completion dates; 
and, in general, a lack of communication with the state. It was encouraged by its 
ability to contact its former members, but found most of them reluctant to retrain. 
One leader stated "they just want another factory job and hope a new factory will open 
in the area." (The Little Falls and ~ontgomery plants are both still vacant.) 
CONCLUSIONS 
Conclusions about the case studies are grouped into comments on: information, 
industrial restructuring, advance notice, production concerns, relocation of work, state 
business climate, key players, and, finally, a comment on Tonka. Comments are 
restricted to statements of observation rather than firm conclusions because of the 
lack of empirical data. 
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Information 
There is a general lack of centralized or organized information about plant 
closings in Minnesota. There is no information available on the number of plant 
closings;25 the average length of unemployment of displaced workers; or their current 
employment status-wages, benefits and so forth. 
Industrial Restructuring 
All four companies were in industries undergoing structural changes. The 
trucking industry was deregulated and faced higher user fees. The farm machinery 
industry was severely hit by the recession and continued its pattern of contraction. 
The toy industry suffered from video game invasion and foreign labor rates. 26 The 
garment industry faced stiff foreign competition (although Munsingwear did not claim 
this to be their primary problem.) It should be noted that not all plant shl,ltdowns are 
the result of industrial restructuring. In fact, efforts should be made to understand 
why a plant is closing in order to fashion a response compatible with the situation. 
Advance Notice 
Farmhand, Tonka and Munsingwear all made statements that their plants were 
going to close before the actual closing. The notices ranged in length from 
approximately six months to a little over a year. At the Minneapolis Munsingwear 
plant this time was used to negotiate closing benefits and to try to persuade the 
company not to close. At Farmhand a closing agreement was also negotiated. At 
Tonka the advance notice was used to plan how to sell the plant and how to help the 
workers to gain new employment. In this context, the question is of ten raised about 
how much advance notice is required to plan for a plant closing. However, perhaps a 
more appropriate question would be what actions are critical to successful planning 
during an advance notice period? Advance notice by itself does not produce a 
transition effort. 
.. 
Production Concerns 
Tonka and Munsingwear (the Minneapolis plant only) were faced with older 
multiple floor plants. Multiple floors often contribute to higher production costs than 
for single floor plants. Farmhand and Munsingwear stated that excess capacity was 
the primary factor in their closing. 
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Relocation of Work 
Knudson Trucking and Tonka transferred jobs that existed in Minnesota to 
.. 
another state. All four businesses studied still have operations in Minnesota; 'Tonka 
and Munsingwear have their corporate headquarters in Minnesota. 
State Business Climate 
Knudsen Trucking firmly stated that it left Minnesota to avoid taxes. Tonka 
planned on reducing unemployment taxes by $100,000 per year by moving to Texas. 
However, their ability to reduce wages by over $4 million per year appears to be a far 
more compelling reason. Farmhand stated it would pay lower. taxes and wages in 
Indiana, but was not trying to escape Minnesota per se. 
Key Players 
Knudson was the sole player in its move to Wisconsin. Both management and 
labor were involved in the Farmhand closing. With Tonka's closing, management, 
labor, community leaders (both city and county), and the state were involved. For the 
Munsingwear closings, the union, the ci~y and the state were involved, with the union 
taking the leading role. The company pursued an adversarial role with the union and a 
"hands off" attitude towards the city and the state. 
In reviewing these cases it appears that although labor and management relations 
were good at Farmhand, a specific program to help those losing their jobs was not 
organized. The antagonistic attitude of management at Munsingwear seemed to stifle 
efforts to organize a program for their workers. The union at Munsingwear was able to 
organize the program. described here, with the aid of the state. At Tonka, the 
cooperation of management, employees, community, and state resulted in the 
organization of a program for their workers. The individual importance and 
contribution of these key players (management, workers, community, and the state) is 
unknown. It appears, however, that lack of management support is a major deterrent. 
At the same time, good management and labor relations does not ensure that a 
response different from business-as-usual will be made for displaced workers • 
. 
Comments on Tonka 
Some have suggested that the ·Tonka experience should be used as a model for 
other plant closings. The assumption behind this view is that this type of process 
helps the workers get back to work faster than leaving them to their own resources. 
However, at present there is not an abundance of empirical data to support or refute 
-14-
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this position. There is data to suggest that displaced workers face extended periods of 
unemployment. As a matter of fact, it is fairly common for 50 percent of displaced 
workers to still be unemployed six months after the shutdown. In Tonka's case at least 
25 percent were still unemployed a year after the shutdown and this figure could go as 
high as nearly 50 percent given the unknown status of 190 workers. 
The cost of unemployment to the state is enormous. In the Tonka example, if 50 
percent of the workers were unemployed for six months, the cost would be over a 
million dollars. The company's share of this cost, paid at the beginning of the year as 
unemployment insurance, would have been approximately $450,000, leaving a state 
deficit of over $600,000. The weekly payments that the state would make in 
unemployment benefits to these workers would be $42,980 (307* workers x $140** 
each per week). At that rate the state could break even on the $125,000 it committed 
to the project, if unemployment per Tonka worker was reduced on the average by 2.9 
weeks. Any reduction above this rate would have resulted in a savings for the state. 
A Final Word 
The overall recommendation of this report is that the state identify its costs and 
potential cost saving actions with regards to plant shutdowns and displaced workers. 
At present, information of this type is not available. The lack of this type of 
information makes it difficult, if not impossible, to make policy decisions based on 
anything other than intuition. Such folklore should no longer be acceptable as the data 
base for making these policy decisions. 
* Half of the 614 displaced workers. 
**The average weekly unemployment benefit at that time (1984}. 
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